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THE FREUDIAN SUPER-EGO: 
A PSYCHOLOGICAL AND THEOLOGICAL STUDY OF CONSCIENCE 
During the last two decades there has been a significant 
resurgence of interest in the study of moral development. After a 
period of seeming agOersion to this topic, the study of moral 
development has once again become an acceptable sphere of study 
within the behavioral sciences. Particularly within psychology 
an impressive array of men is presently engaged in serious study 
in this field. A listing of influential figures would have to 
include Jean Piaget, Robert Sears, and E. H. Erikson.' 
On4thing which these otherwise varied theorists share is 
the heritage of Freud. The influence of such Freudian concepts 
as the "super•ego," "identification," and the "Oedipus complex" 
has been enormous. These concepts have not been limited to 
contemporary psychoanalytic theory and therapy, but they have also 
helped shape the empirical study of conscience 'itbin academic 
psychology. There is virtually no theory of moral development in 
which some formative influence of Freud cannot be seen. The work 
of many theorists, such as Erikson, has been an extension of Freud's 
work, while the work of other theorists, such as Piaget, has been a 
reaction to Freudian theory. 
The primary purpose of this study is to examine Freud's concept 
of the super-ego and its related concepts. This examination will be 
conducted on the basis of Freud's collected works. Three monographs 
2 
of Freud are of particular importance in a consideration of the 
super-ego and its related concepts; these works are Mourning and 
Melancholia,2 The Elm and the Id,3 and The Dissolution of the 
Super-ego.4 
This investigation of Freudian thought is intended for the 
reader who possesses a working knowledge of psychoanalytic theory. 
No attempt will be made to present Freud's thought in a complete and 
ready-made theoretical structure for the convenience of the novice. 
Rather, Freud's relevant theoretical advances will be presented 
according to the uneven lines of their development. 
The investigation of the Freudian super-ego and its related 
concepts will be followed by a critique of Freud's theoretical 
position. This will be done primarily on the basis of the theory 
itself; that is, its organic unity, or lack thereof, and the theory's 
ability to account for the available data. 
A second major purpose of this study is to present the Pauline 
concept of  GI-dfr'reiex-Yur  . Due to the limited nature of this 
investigation, it will not be possible to investigate this term 
throughout the New Testament. However, such a limitation would not 
appear significantly to handicap this study. This is evidenced by 
the fact that Paul's usage would appear to be normative for the 
entire New Testament.
5 
In conclusion this study will compare Freud's super-ego with 
Paul's usage of conscience. Such an identification has often been 
made, but there are few studies which have attempted an investigation 
3 
of what their precise relationship is. Thus this study purposes to 
further the investigation of this relationship by examining those 
areas of Freud's super-ego and Paul's conscience which are similar 
and dissimilar. 
The Super-ego in Freudian Thought 
Freud began writing about the moral functions of the mind 
before 1900 in letters to his close friend Fliess. However, the 
first published indication of Freud's growing interest in the problem 
of moral prohibition is found in The Interpretation of Dreams (1900)6  
in which Freud refers to the phenomenon of the censorship of dreams. 
Freud concluded that in every human being there are two psychic 
forces or systems. One of these forces forms the wish expressed 
by the dream, while the other force exercises a censorship over this 
dream-wish. This censoring force of the individual causes a distortion 
in the dream. In this way the wish feelings inherentt in dreams are 
repressed.? 
With the publication of Totem and Taboo (1913),$ Freud's growing 
concern with morality became explicit. Here he introduces the idea of 
conscience and sees it as being an outgrowth of the taboo of 
primitive cultures. "Conscience is the inner perception of objections 
to definite wish impulses that exist in us . . . ."9 The oldest form of pu 
conscience is to be found in the taboo. Taboo is likewise a command at. 
of conscience which when violated produces a terrible sense of guilt. 
Freud further theorized that conscience probably originated in 
an ambivalent feeling toward an interpersonal relationship. Such an 
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origin of conscience was suggested to him by his clinical work with 
those suffering from compulsion neurosis. Compulsion neurosis is 
characterized by a painful conscientiousness which reminded Freud 
of an exabration of the normal conscience. Since he attributed 
compulsive neurosis to the tension of two contrasting feelings, 
one conscious and the other unconscious, Freud theorized that here 
was an analogy which demonstrated the origin of conscience. The 
conscience must result from the tension of two ambivalent feelings.10 
Among the most important of Freud's writings is On Narcissism: 
An Introduction (1914).11 Its importance stems from the pivotal role 
it played in the evolution of Freudian thought. Perhaps the most 
significant of its contributions is that it introduced the concept 
of the "ego ideal" and the self-observing agency related to it, 
which were the basis of what was eventually to be described as the 
"super-ego." 
In this work repression is discussed as a function of the ego. 
Man has the tendency to set up in himself an ideal by which he then 
measures his actual self. For the ego the formation of such an 
ideal serves as the conditioning factor of repression.12  
As the child grows older the narcissistic love that he once 
had for himself is displaced on to this new ideal ego. Freud 
continues; 
It would not surprise us if we were to find a special 
psychical agency which performs the task of seeing that 
narcissistic satisfaction from the ego ideal is ensured 
and which, with this end in view, constantly watches 
the actual ego and measures it by that ideal. If such an 
agency does exist, we cannot possibly come upon it as a 
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discovery—we can only recognize it; for we may reflect 
that what we call our "conscience" has the required 
characteristics.i3 
In Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis (1915-1917)14  
Freud again returned to the topic which he had discussed in 
On Narcissism: An Introduction. Whereas in this earlier work 
Freud had stated that he would not be surprised to find a "special 
psychical agency" within the ego, Freud was now willing to state 
without qualification that there was "in the ego an agency which 
unceasingly observes, criticizes and compares, and in that way sets 
itself over against the other part of the ego."15 
Freud in a letter dated May 31, 1897, to his friend Fliess had 
dealt briefly with the topic of melancholia and identification. In 
1915 Freud again dealt with this topic in a monograph entitled 
Mourning and Melancholia.16 In this monograph Freud asserts that 
somehow melancholia and mourning are connected. Mourning is regularly 
a reaction to the loss of a loved one or some valued abstraction, such 
as one's country or liberty. In other individuals these same influences 
produce melancholia instead of mourning. 
However, certain mental features do allow one to distiiguish. 
between mourning and melancholia. Melancholia is characterized by 
a profoundly painful dejection, cessation of interest in 
the outside world, loss of capacity to love, inhibition 
of all activity, and a lowering of the self-regarding 
feelings to a degree that finds utterance in self-
reproaches and self-revilings, and cntelinates in a 
delusional expectation of punishment. 
The same is true of mourning except that the disturbance of self-regard 
is Absent. Freud theorized that this difference would suggest that 
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melancholia results when an object-loss is withdrawn from conscious-
ness, whereas mourning results from an object-loss which remains 
conscious. Thus in mourning it would seem perfectly natural that 
there would be a loss Of interest and general inhibition since the 
ego is fully absorbed by the work of mourning,18 While in melancholia 
this same loss of interest and general inhibition seems puzzling since 
there would seem to be no realistic grounds for mourning. 
An individual who suffers from melancholia represents himself to 
others as worthless, incapable of any achievement, and morally wretched. 
Freud saw in this behavior the fact that one part of the ego had set 
itself apart over against the remainder of the ego. Thus one part of 
the ego assumes a judicial function and takes the rest of the ego as 
its object.19  
One of Freud's observations in this regard is of critical 
importance. While listening to melancholics' various self-accusations, 
he could not avoid the impression that often the most violent of the 
accusations were hardly applicable to the patient himself. However, 
with a minimum of modifications these accusations did fit someone 
whom the patient has loved, loves, or should love. Freud theorized 
that what had taken place was that the self-reproaches perceived in 
the patient were actually reproaches against a love-object which the 
patient had shifted from the love-object to his own ego. Freud in 
summarizing this process writes: 
An object-choice, an attachment of the libido to a particular 
person, had at one time existed; then, owing to a real 
slight or disappointment coming from this loved person, the 
object-relationship was shattered. The result was not the 
normal one of a withdrawal of the libido from this object 
and a displacement of it on to a new one, but something 
different, for whose coming-about various conditions seem 
to be necessary. The object cathexis proved to have little 
power of resistance and was brought to an end. But the 
free libido was not displaced on to another object; it 
was withdrawn into the ego. There, however, it was not 
employed in any unspecified way, but served to establish 
an identification of the ego with the abandoned object. 
Thus the shadow of the object fell upon the ego, and the 
latter could henceforth be judged by a special agency, as 
though it were an object, the forsaken object. In this 
way an object-loss was transformed into an ego-loss and 
the conflict between the ego and the loved person into 
a cleavage between the critical activ4Ay of the ego and 
the ego as altered by identification. 
This form of identification Freud termed narcissistic identifica-
tion. In one respect such identification is a regression since the 
normal course of development begins with a narcissistic self-love and 
then gradually the libido is detached from the self and becomes attached 
to an object-choice. In narcissistic identification this course of 
events has been revdrsed, 
The importance of this monograph stems from the fact that Freud 
here theorized that a portion of the ego under certain circumstances 
may be set apart from the remainder of the ego. This separation 
within the ego then results in a judicial function of a portion of 
the egovAbis portion of the ego Freud referred to as conscience. 
In 1923 Freud introduced the term super-ego to represent this 
critical-judging portion of the ego. This was done in a monograph 
entitled The le and the Id (1923).21 In this work Freud reassesses 
the significance of his theorizations in Mourning and Melancholia. 
Freud writes: 
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We succeeded in explaining the painful disorder 
of melancholia by supposing that (in those suffer- 
ing from it) an object which was lost has been set 
up again inside the ego--that is, that an object- 
cathexis has been replaced by an identification. 
At that time, however, we did not appreciate the 
full significance of this process and did not know 
how common and typical it is. Since then we have 
come to understand that this kind of substitution 
has a great share in determining the form taken by the 
ego and that it makes an essential contribu%kon towards 
building up what is called itsmcharacter."" 
Character formation is then the result of the process of identifica- 
tion. Identification occurs when an individual is forced to give up 
a sexual object. At such a time there occurs an alteration of the ego 
which Freud felt could best be described as "a setting up of the object 
inside the ego • • • ."23 Freud readily admits that the exact nature of 
this substitution is at this time unknown, but suggests that identificat 
tion may be the sole condition under which the id can give up its 
objects. At any rate, Freud continues, "the character of the ego 
is a precipitate of abandoned object-cathexes and . . . it contains the 
history of those object choices."24 While such a process of identifica 
tion is most common, individuals do have varying capacities for 
resistance. Such capacities for resistance decide the extent to whioth 
the individual's character will resist or accept the influences of his 
erotic object-choices. 
identifications made in early childhood are particularly general 
and lasting in their effect. Of extreme importance in character 
formation is the first identification, the identification of the individual 
with his father or mother. This first identification Freud referred to 
as being both intricate and problematic. This results from two factors: 
the Oedipus situation and the bisexuality of each individual.
25 
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At an early age the male child develops an object-cathexis for 
his mother. At first the child deals with his father by identifying 
himself with him. However, as the child's sexual wishes toward his 
mother become more intense, the child begins to perceive his father as 
an obstacle. The child's relationship with his father now takes on hostile 
coloring and changes into a wish to get rid of his father so that he 
might take the father's place with the mother. This hostility of the 
child toward his father varies in intensity and may best be described as 
an ambivalent attitude. Simultaneously, his attitude toward his mother 
is solely affectionate. Freud referred to this triangular situation 
26 
as the Oedipus complex. 
On this occasion Freud does not deal with the dynamics involved 
in the demolition of the Oedipus complex. Rather, Freud simply assumes 
that such a dissolution will be the case. When the boy's object-
cathexis of his mother must be given up, one of two things may happen. 
There may take place either an identification with his mother or an 
intensification of his identification with his father. The relative 
strength of the child's sexual dispositions will determine whether the 
outcome of the Oedipus situation will be an intensification of the 
identification with the father or an identification with the mother. In 
the case of the male child it would be more normal for the former to 
occur. Thus the dissolution of the Oedipus complex would result in a 
consolidation in the masculinity of the boy's character.27  
The identification which follows the dissolution of the Oedipus 
complex resulti in the super-ego's adoption of the attitudes and behavior 
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of its object-choice. Thus the child strives to become like his parents. 
But at the same time the content of the super-ego is not simply a 
residue of the child's object-choice, for the super-ego also contains 
powerful reaction-formations against its object-choices. Thus the 
super-ego not only says, "You must be like your father," but also "you 
may not be like your father;" that is, you may not do everything your 
father does. This double aspect of the super-ego, Freud says, results 
from the fact that the super-ego also has the task of repressing the 
Oedipus complex.
28 
In direct proportion to the intensity with which the individual 
experienced the Oedipus complex is the influence that the super-ego 
will have over the ego. This can be seen both in terms of the conscience's 
strength and the amount of unconscious guilt.29  
As the individual grows older, the role of his father is carried 
on by teachers and other individuals in authority. Their injunctions. 
and prohibitions, in turn, are assimilated into the super-egoand there, 
in the form of conscience, continue to exercise moral censorship. Any 
tension between the individual'd conscience and the actual performance of 
his ego is experiencedas a sense of guilt.
30 
As we have seen, the process of identification is dependent upon 
the ending of the Oedipus complex. In 1924 Freud published a monograph 
on this topic entitled The Dissolution of the Oedipus Complex On 
this occasion Freud indicated that there were at least three possible 
interpretations regarding the dissolution of the Oedipus complex. 
His first suggestion is that it could be the result of a painful 
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experience on the part of the child. The young boy could awaken one 
day to find that his mother's love has been transferred to a new arrival 
to the family. Thus he can no longer consider his mother to be his own 
properiy.32  
A second view is that the Oedipus complex must collapse, just as the 
milk-teeth fall out when the permanent ones begin to grow. Thus the 
Oefdpus complex would be considered a phenomenon determined and governed 
by heredity, and it would consequently pass away at the appropriate 
developmental stage.
23 
However, it is a third view which Freud clearly favors and develops 
in detail. As the male child develops sexually, his genitals become a 
source of great interest. The child's interest is betrayed by the fact 
that he manipulates them frequently. Adults do not approve of such 
behavior. Finally the child is threatened. He is told that this part of 
him which he values so greatly will be taken away from him. At first 
the boy does not believe the threat, but this unbelief is sooner or 
later broken down by the sight of the female genitals. The sight of a 
little girl who is so much like himself except that she has no penis makes 
the threat of castration suddenly become imaginable. The child is faced 
with a conflict. At present the child stands in the Oedipus attitude 
toward his parents. His masturbation is only a genital discharge of 
sexual excitement belonging to the Oedipus complex. However, for him 
to continue in such a way would cost him his penis. The cost is too 
great, and the child's ego turns away from the Oedipus complex.34  
With the repression of the Oedipus complex, the child gives up 
his object-cathexes, and they are then replaced by identifications. 
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The authority, attitudes, and values of the father or parents are 
introjected into the ego, and there it forms the super-ego. To 
this process we have previously made reference. 
The Future of an Illusion (1927)35 contains only a brief reference 
to the super-ego, but in this brief discussion Freud outlines an intriguing 
characteristic of the super-ego. The super-ego, through a process of 
transformation during the course of many generations, is capable of a 
cultural strengthening. Freud declares: 
It is not true that the human mind has undergone no 
development since the earliest times and that, in 
contrast to the advances of science and technology, 
it is the same today as it was at the beginning 
of history. We can point out one of these mental 
advances at once. It is in keeping with the 
course of human development that external coercion 
gradually becomes internalized; for a special mental 
agency, man's_` super-ego, takes it over and includes 
it among its commandments. Every child presents 
this process of transformation to us; only by that 
means does it become a moral and social being. Such 
a strengthening of the super-ego is a most_precious 
cultural asset in the psychological field.jo 
Freud once again examines the relationship of the super-ego to 
culture or societylbaCivilization and Its Discontents (1930).37 Without 
the super-ego. of the individual, society would not be able to exist 
amidst the aggressiveness of its citizens. By means of the super-ego, 
the individual's aggressiveness is introjected or internalized. In 
this manner the harsh aggressiveness is turned back on the ego. If 
it were not for the super-ego, these same aggressions would be unleashed 
by the ego upon others.38  
As would be expected, there develops then, a tension between the 
ego and the super-ego. This results in a senseof guilt, which expresses 
13 
itself as a need for punishment. In this way civilization further 
gains control over the individual." 
In Freud's last work, An Outline of Psychoanalysis (1940),"  
Freud again returned to a theme which he mentioned in passing in 
his earlier monograph, The Eal and the Id. There Freud had referred to 
an identification which preceded that identification which resulted from 
the dissolution of the Oedipus complex. This identification he refers to 
as "primary identification." In 1940 Freud elaborated on whit 
he had understood by primary identification. 
The long period of childhood, during which the growing 
human being lives in dependence upon his parents, leaves 
behind it a'precipitate, which forms within his ego a 
special agency in which this parental influence is pro-
longed. The parents" influence actually includes not merely 
the personalities of the parentmthemselves but also the 
racial, national, and family traditions handed on through 
them as well as the demands of the immediate social milieu 
which they represent. In the.same way, an individual's 
super-ego in the course of his development takes over con-
tributions.from later successors and substitutes of his 
parents, such as teachers, admired figures in public life, 
or high social ideals.*1  
A Psychological Analysis 
of the Freudian Concept of the Super-ego 
During the history of mankind few theories have beewaubjected 
to so much searching, and often bitter, criticism as has Freudian theory. 
In modern times only Darwin's theory of evolution has been attacked, 
reviled, ridiculed, and slandered with comparable vehemence. It is 
not the intention of this study to present a history of such criticism. 
Rather, this critique will consist in an analysis of the Freudian theory 
ufA: 
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of moral development. But prior to the critique itself, the 
assumptions on which thisi evaluation will be made must' themselves 
be made explicit. 
Since the object of this evaluation is a theory, it would be 
beneficial first to consider what a theory is. The working defini-
tion employed in this study is that a theory is "a cluster of rele-
vant assumptions, systematically related to each other, and a set 
of empirical definitions .442  
According to this definition the assumptions upon which a theory 
is based must be related directly to the empirical events or behav-
ior of which the theory is an explanation. The good theory is 
one which contains useful and predictive assumptions concerning 
empirical events which are contained within the behavioral category 
under investigation.43 
Not only must the assumptions be stated clearly, but all of 
the various elements contained in the theory must be explicitly 
related to each other. Thus there must be rules which define the 
manner in which the assumptions and concepts of the theory are 
interrelated. In this way there will be a systematic interaction 
within the theory in order that all of the internal relations are 
clear.44  
Finally a good theory must be capable of empirical definitions. 
Such definitions are essential if there is to be interaction between 
the concepts of the theory and reality. Without empirical definitions 
it would be impossible to gather data, since.the concepts of the 
theory would lack afttecedents in the empirical world.45 
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If a theory is good, then it will lead to the observation 
and collection of relevant empirical relations. In this way a good 
theory will lead to a systematic expansion of knowledge. The func- 
tion of a theory can be compared to a "proposition mill" which grinds 
out related empirical statements which are then, on the basis of further 
research, capable of confirmation or rejection. Secondly, a good 
theory will permit the incorporation of known empirical findings into 
a consistent and reasonably simple framework. Thus a theory tit also a 
means of organizing and integrating all that is known concerning the 
subject under consideration." 
The gravest criticism of Freud's theory of moral development is 
that his theory does not allow for empirical consequences. As was 
noted above, a good theory must allow for the translation of its 
concepts into empirical propositions. The concept of the super-ego 
is not capable of such empirical definition. Although the concept 
of the super-ego does help to "explain" certain phenomena, its explana- 
tion is of an after-the-fact variety And means very little. The super- 
ego is considered to be a bad theory Linasmstabh as it does not allow 
for predictions in advance of actual behavior. 
The concept of identification can be more readily translated 
into empirical categories than can the super-ego, and yet this 
Freudian concept likewise has severe limitations. Through this one 
concept Freud attempted to explain mourning, conscience, and sexual 
identity. Such an overarching theory seems to have been doomed from 
the outset because of the diversity of behavior involved in mourning, 
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conscience, and sexual identity. Possibly Freud would have been 
better advised to theorize that there are three different determinants.
47 
The inability of the same concept of identification to account 
for such diversified phenomena as mourning and sexual identity can be 
readily seen by comparing the identification said to result from mourn- 
ing with the identification resulting from the dissolution of the 
Oedipus complex. In the state of mourning, Freud maintained, the 
mourner introjects the ego of the lost loveobject. However, the 
identification with which the Oedipus complex ends does not result 
in a similar introjection of the lost loye-object's ego; for if the 
male child were to follow the dictates of the theory, he would introject 
the ego of his mother. Such an introjection would transfer the sexual 
identity of the mother to the boy. This clearly contradicts the 
known empirical data; Most boys do not become girls. Rather, the male 
child somehow introjects the ego of his father, and in this way his 
sexual identity as a male is established. Identification under these 
two circumstances appears to be two different processes.
48 
In studying Freud's theory of.moral development, it readily becomes 
evident that Freud labors under a limited view of what moralization involves. 
For Freud the moralization of the child meant little more than the control 
of sexual and aggressive behavior. Consequently, his treatment of the 
topic of moral development is quite limited. The topics of moral 
knowledge and moral thought are left untouched. It has not been until 
the present century that this imbalance has been corrected and attention 
has been given to the intellectual aspects of moral development.49 
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Another criticism of Freud concerns his methodology. The research 
of Freud which resulted in his theories did not take place in the con-
trolled conditions of the laboratory. Rather, Freud's data came from 
observations he made during the treatment of patients. Accordingly, 
the conclusions he arrived at were made by a line of reasoning which 
was rarely explicit. Freud's writings are confided to his conclusions. 
The reader is asked to accept on faith the validity of his inductive 
and deductive operations, for nowhere does he present the original 
data, the method of analysis utilized, or any systematic presentation 
of his empirical findings. Thus it is practically impossible to repeat 
any of Freud's investigations. 
And yet some of these liabilities of Freud's theory have also been 
assets. Lionel Trilling and W. H. Auden recognized in Freud a deep 
currentof romanticism. This can be seen in his "sense of the role of 
impulse, of the drama of life, the power of symbolism, of the ways of 
knowing that were more poetic than rational in spirit . . ."5°  
The skillful way in which Freud employed mythological allusions to put 
across abstruse concepts and his picturesque language are indicative of 
this poetic spirit. The excitement of this spirit has gained for Freud 
an enormous following. It is in this role that Freud has made his 
greatest contribution to the study of moral development. Freud asked 
questions which he was unable to answer completely. However, in 
addition to the questions, Freud also provided the motivation for 
continuing study. 
18 
The Concept of Conscience in Pauline Usage 
The word "conscience" ( e7 ) is derived from the stem 
of the verb  (fL/K , which means "I know in common with." The 
stem implies knowledge about another person which can be used in witness 
51 
for or against him. 
In the New Testament the word suneidesis appears thirty times. 
53 53 





three in I Peter,
56 
and two in Acts.57 
Any attempt to determine the meaning of suneidesis in the New 
Testament must differ from most similar quests in the New Testament, for 
the word suneidesis makes virtually no appearance in the Septuagint. 
Consequently, no recourse can be made to any Hebrew idea in the Old 
Testament which might serve to elucidate the meaning of suneidesis for 
the New Testament writers.
58 
The Hebrewi failure to develop an examined theory of conscience comes 
as no surprise when one considers their theological emphases. Hebrew 
thinking is strongly theocentric and not introspective. God as King 
and man as obedient servant is emphasized. The obedience which God 
demands has been revealed to man from a source outside of man. Thus 
the Law and the Prophets, not knowledge of self (including the conscience), 
teach the fear of the Lord and are the beginning of wisdom. Hence, there 
was present no strong urge to examine the inner motives of man's behavior 
and man's subjective psychological phenomena.59  
This leads to the conclusion that the question of the origin of 
the New Testament's usage of suneidesis can be answered in one of two 
t9 
manners. Either the New Testament authors invented this word to 
describe an experience which was peculiar to Christianity, or they 
must have adopted the word and the ideas connoted by it from some 
non-Hebrew source. Accordingly, the search for a possible source of 
New Testament usage must n9w turn to the Gentile world. 
A study of the surviving literary remains of the Hellenistic world 
reveals that the Greek usage of suneidesis can be divided into two 
categories. On the one hand, suneidesis was used by the philosophers in 
technical or semi-technical writings. Here it was used in a non-
moral context and can best be paraphrased "I am conscious within my 
self that . . . ." From this technical sense suneidesis evolved into an 
"everyday" word. In the latter usage the meaning of suneidesis became 
the content of the individual's consciousness of his own acts or 
behavior in terms of their moral quality." 
Since the New Testament authors did not write for professional 
philosophers, it is the latter colloquial usage of suneidesis which 
concerns this study. Within the context of this "popular folk-wisdom," 
suneidesis was viewed as a faculty implanted in man, which was his by 
right of his very nature. Thus suneidesis functioned by necessity, as 
an expression of man's constitution. Therefore, every man was thought 
to have a suneidesis.61 
The suneidesis comes into activity in connection with a person's 
own deeds. The subject of an individual's suneidesis is the quality 
of his own acts and character and is not concerned with the acts and 
character of others.62 
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Suneidesis concerns itself almost exclusively with acts or deeds. 
Its reference to character only takes place in so far as character is 
both determined and expressed by specific acts.63 Likewise, it is with 
past acts that the suneidesis concerns itself. It is specific acts of 
past wrong-doing as opposed to a continued and habitual condition of 
character which calls forth the suneidesis.64 
Finally, the Hellenistic "popular philosophy" viewed the suneidesis  
as emerging in pain. Man is so formed by his nature that if he oversteps 
the moral limits of nature, he normally feel pain.65 This pain might 
best be described as a combination of fear and shame which results in 
guilt. This guilt, in turn, paralyses and destroys the individual.66 
Due to the limitations of this study, the consideration of the 
New Testament use of suneidesis must be confined to the Pauline corpus. 
There is good evidence that such a limitation will not seriously distort 
the general New Testament usage. This is evidenced to by the fact that 
Paul is the first of the New Testament authors to use suneidesis. 
Secondly, Paul uses suneidesis more than any other Biblical writer. 
Thirdly, Paul builds more upon this term than does any of the other 
New Testament authors. Consequently, it has been most common to accept 
Paul's usage of suneidesis as normative for the early Christian community 
and likewise normative for the sacred Scriptures produced by this 
community.
67 
For the purposes of this investigation, the Pauline usage of 
suneidesis will be considered on the basis of the Corinthian and 
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Roman epistles. It is not within the scope of this study to engage in 
questions of authorship. The Corinthian and Roman epistles age generally 
accepted as by Paul himself, but a strong body of competent opinion 
denies the Pauline authorship of the Pastorals. Hebrews, in turn, is 
an anonymous piece of writing, and nowhere does it claim the authorship 
of Paul. Thus this study will directly concern itself with the use of 
suneidesis only in the Corinthian and Roman epistles. 
Paul assumes that all men possess the faculty of suneidesis. Paul's 
argument in the second chapter of Romans makes it apparent that Paul 
viewed man's suneidesis as something man possessed by reason of his very 
nature as a man.
68 
For Paul suneidesis concerns itself primarily with individual deeds. 
Paul's extended discourses in Corinthians regarding the giving of offense 
to the weak concerns itself with specific deeds, the eating of meat 
offered to idols while in the presence of less enlightened Christians." 
Paul's usage is once again in agreement with the usage common to the 
Hellenistic world; he too viewed suneidesis as primarily concerning 
44001 with individual acts and only secondarily with character. 
Likewise, Pauline usage of suneidesis indicates that its object 
is always acts of wrong-doing. Suneidesis tells man that he is doing 
something which is wrong. The function of suneidesis is seen as passing 
a negative judgment." Suneidesis can only showman what is right in 
the sense that he fails to feel remorse after the questionable act has 
been committed.
71 
Not until the third century and onward does conscience 
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come to be thought of as a "positive, selective power enabling us to 
know what is right before we do it . . . • " This function of the 
suneidesis is foreign to both the fourteen Pauline occurrences and 
common Greek usage.72 
The object of suneidesis according to Pauline usage is always past 
acts. There are no occurrences in Paul which parallel modern English 
usage,which makes conscience a guide to future action. Suneidesis only 
functions in terms of past acts or deeds. Thus the absence of any 
conscience pangs cannot be taken as conclusive proof as toi.the moral 
quality of any intended acts."  
In accordance with common Hellenistic usage, Paul held that 
suneidesis emerges in the life of the individual as pain. In counselling 
the Roman Christians to accept the authority of their government, Paul 
cautions that disobedience not only means the wrath of God but also 
trouble from one's suneidesis.74 From the context it is clear that the 
trouble cautioned against is the pain of a guilty suneidesis. 
As can readily be seen, Paul has in general taken over the popular 
Greek usage of suneidesis.75  But at the same time, Paul did make 
significant alterations as to its basic connotations, although the 
alterations are primarily in regard to details. Paul placed it within 
the setting of the Judaeo-Christian doctrine of God as both righteous 
Creator and sustainer of all things. This God judges all men by the 
absolute moral standards inherent in the divine nature, as revealed in 
the person of Christ Jesus.76 
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Perhaps the most significant alteration introduced by Paul was his 
emphatic distinction between the strong and weak suneidesis. In his 
letters to the church at Corinth Paul recognizes the existence of 
variability among the suneidesis of different individuals. This may 
be due to a lack of knowledge, a force of habit, or a lack of ability 
to withstand the example of others.
77 
The significance of such a 
distinction is to be found in its ethical implications. 88cause the 
Christian stands within the context of God's glory, it is necessary that 
he always be conscious of the fact that his brother's suneidesis may 
react differently than his.
78 
Paul never viewed suneidesis as his crowning "moral doctttne." 
In fact, there is every reason to believe that Paul introduced 
suneidesis into Christianity under the compulsion of his encounter with 
the Corinthian church. Perhaps the Corinthians defended their practice 
of eating meat offered to idols by pointing to their sundidesis. Paul's 
immediate reaction had been to perceive both the liability of suneidesis  
to error through defective knowledge and its major defect as an ethical 
norm, its negativity.
79 
The probability that this term was one forced 
upon him by his opponents at Corinth is heightened by the fact that 
while dealing with an identical topic in Romans 14:15 as in I Cor. 8:10, 
Paul avoids the term entirely. Paul's usage of suneidesis can be partially 
accounted for by the policy of his ministry that he would be all things 
to all men.80 
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A Comparison of Freud's Super-ego and Paul's Conscience 
and Freud's 
In conclusion, a comparison will be made between PaullsAconcepts 
of conscience. In the past these concepts have been almost glibly 
equated without a thorough understanding of their relationship.
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These concluding remarks will sketch their relationship and make explicit 
their points of agreement and disagreement. 
A first point for comparison is their respective theories regarding 
the origin of conscience. Freud theorized that conscience was the 
result of identification, and identification was primarily the result 
of the dissolution of the Oedipus complex. In effect, Freud was saying 
that morality is not instilled by God but is acquired from society or 
more directly from parents.
82 
Paul stands in disagreement with Freud on 
the question of origin. Paul views conscience as a faculty which man pos- 
sesses by right of his humanity. To this extent the influence of 
Hellenistic thought can be seen in Paul. In addition, Paul modified 
the Greek concept of the conscience's origin by implicitly tracing its 
origin to God. 83 
Conscience serves as a judicial function for both Freud and 
Paul. Freud views the super-ego or conscience as a psychfal agency 
within the individual which constantly observes, criticizes and compares 
the actual behavior of the individual;with an ideal self.84 Paul's usage 
does not significantly differ from this aspect of Freudian usage. 
Both Freud and Paul agree as to the pervasiveness of the 
phonomenon of conscience. Bach viewed every man as possessing this 
faculty. 
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Likewise, each agreed that not all consciences were equally 
operative. Freud theorized that the level to which an individual's 
conscience develops is a function of the intensity of the Oedipus 
complex experienced by the individual. Freud pointed to women as 
validating this point. Since they are not able to experience the 
Oedipus complex to the same degree as do men, women tend to be less 
moral than men.85 Paul also divided consciences into categories which 
reflect different levels of efficiency. Paul recognizes the existence 
of such a variability when he speaks of strong consciences and weak 
consciences.
86 
During the previous study of Pauline usage, it was concluded 
that for him the conscience always had as its object past events. For 
Paul the realm of the conscience was not future behavior. This observa-
tion is not true of Freudian usage. Freud thought of conscience as 
having a broader role. The significance of the conscience could be 
seen in planning and future decisions. The content of the conscience 
contained innumerable attitudes and values which had been introjected from 
lost love-objects. For example, a woman might have a compulsion for 
chocolate candy because her lover, who later jilted her, was particularly 
fond of chocolate candy. 
Another area of agreement between Freud and Paul is that the object 
of one's conscience is always his own behavior. Guilt results only when 
we violate the dictates of our conscience. Guilt never results when 
someone else violates the dictates of our conscience. 
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In Freudian theory the conscience tells the individual what he 
should do and also what he should not do. Thus in this respect the 
super-ego once again occupies a broader sphere of direction than does the 
Pauline conscience. The Pauline conscience only functions in response 
to wrong-doing. Conscience is always evoked as a negative response. 
Freud and Paul are once again in agreement that when one ignores 
the dictates of his super-ego or conscience, pain as a consequence 
normally follows. Paul was satisfied to accept this aspect of conscience 
as defined by the Hellenistic world. Freud has elaborated on the pain 
more than has Paul. Freud sees this pain as arising because of the tension 
between the ego and the super-ego. This tension or pain is experienced 
most directly in the form of guilt. 
One of the major differences in their respective treatments accorded 
the concept of conscience higges on the relative importance of this con-
cept for their work as a whole. In the case of Freud, the super-ego is 
of key importance. Through this concept Freud accounts for the ability 
of society to contain the aggressive and hostile impulses of man. Without 
the super-ego, life within a social context would be impossible. But 
such importance is not accorded the conscience in the overarching theology 
of Paul. Paulamerely accepted this concept and assimilated it into his 
theology because of his pastoral concerns with the church at Corinth. 
Thus the concept of conscience for Paul never approaches the importance 
accorded it by Freud. 
No comparison between Freud and Paul could be complete without first 
considering their respective views of men. Freud lived and worked within 
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a world that saw man as the summit of an evolutionary process. In man God 
or nature had shown a persistent wisdom in its effort to produce a final 
product. This was the image of man which Freud's theory so significantly 
altered. Freud presented man as the unfinished product of nature. He 
saw man struggling against unreason, driven by drives and urges which 
must be contained if man were to live in society. Man was host both 
to seeds of madness and majesty. "What Freud was proposing was that 
man at his best and man at his worst is subject to a common set of 
explanations: that good and evil grow from a common process 
Paul's anthropology to a certain extent coincides with that of Freud. 
He too saw the countless evil forces with which man was daily forced to 
contend. And yet Paul could have never agreed with the pessimism inherent 
invxdiew that "good and evil both grow from a common process." For Paul 
all good had its foundation in Jesus Christ, the incarnate Son of God. 
It was because of this focal position of the Christ that conscience 
need not play a more vital role in the thought of Paul. Freud's theory 
demanded a conscience of super-ego so that a social form of life could 
be a possibility. But Paul saw social life as possible because men had 
been created in the image of God. Despite the distortion of this image 
in sin, God still sustained life. The conclusive testimony to the 
sustaining providence of God was the incarnation, death, and resurrection 
of Jesus Christ. 
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